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Chapter 1
Knowledge, Action, and Space: 
An Introduction
Peter Meusburger and Benno Werlen
 Open and Contested Research Questions
This book starts from the widely accepted premise that parts of knowledge can be 
defined as ability, aptitude, or “capacity for social action” (Stehr, 1994, p. 95)1 and 
that the production and dissemination of knowledge are always embedded in spe-
cific environments (spatial context, spatial relations, and power structures). That 
point of departure makes it evident that the mutual relations between knowledge, 
action, and space are central research issues in disciplines dealing with human exis-
tence. For instance, acting under conditions of uncertainty, people must rely on 
experience gained in various situations and environments. To achieve their goals, 
they have to gather new information, acquire new knowledge, and develop new 
skills in order to cope with unexpected situations and unfamiliar challenges. 
Knowledge, experience, and information-processing are the foremost resources 
determining how aims of actions are set; how situations, opportunities, and risks are 
assessed; and how constellations, cues, and patterns are interpreted. They are the 
primary foundations for evaluating locations and spatial configurations, solving 
1 The close relationship between knowledge and power is evident by the very fact that they have the 
same etymological roots. The word power derives from the Latin potere (to be able). The Latin 
noun potentia denotes an ability, capacity, or aptitude to affect outcomes, to make something pos-
sible. It can therefore be translated as both knowledge and power (see also Avelino & Rotmans, 
2009, p. 550; Meusburger, 2015c, p. 31; Moldaschl & Stehr, 2010, p. 9; Schönrich, 2005, p. 383). 
Most authors define action as goal-directed human activity that should be differentiated from pure 
behavior. Action is that part of behavior that occurs intentionally (see the Chap. 6 by Joachim 
Funke in this volume). Knowledge has an impact on action and behavior.
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2problems, and enabling individual actors and social systems to appropriate space. 
Knowledge, learning, and information-processing can be regarded as links between 
action and space or action and environment (for details see Meusburger, 2003). 
Conversely, the spatial dimension plays a key role in the acquisition of knowledge 
and the implementation of actions. Scholars broadly agree on several points:
• Commitment and willful intent alone do not guarantee goal attainment.
• Goal-setting (is a given goal desirable and feasible?) and goal-striving (how is 
the goal being pursued?) are affected by knowledge, skills, experience, and the 
search for new information.
• Experience rests upon former actions in specific settings.
• There are manifold relationships between knowledge, power, and action,
• Learning processes are embedded in, and to some extent shaped by, the social 
and material environment.
• Settings and locations have a fundamental significance in the search for and 
access to rare or valuable information, the acquisition and distribution of knowl-
edge, and the successful implementation of actions.
However, the devil is in the details. Relationships between knowledge, action, 
and space are very complex, some of them are still not fully understood. Some theo-
retical approaches focus on very simple problems (laboratory experiments) or work 
with a number of black boxes or questionable premises. Studying the interrelations 
of knowledge and action, one is apt to raise the following questions: To what extent 
is knowledge a precondition for action? How much knowledge is necessary for 
action? To what extent do various types of knowledge influence aspirations, atten-
tion, evaluation of situations, search for alternatives, implementation of intentions, 
decision-making, and problem-solving? How do bidirectional connections between 
knowledge and action function? How do different representations of knowledge 
shape action? Are knowledge, skills, experience, and educational achievement use-
ful categories or should they be replaced by broader terms such as “reflective sys-
tem” or “cognitive capacities”? How rational is human behavior? What categories 
of rationality should be distinguished? Does irrational behavior reflect a lack of 
appropriate information or is it rather affected by the impulsive system and orienta-
tion knowledge? How do deliberative, rational thought and impulsive affect interact 
and influence action? Why do people occasionally act against their knowledge? 
What are the social functions of knowledge? In which way can action research 
profit from interventions of arts and aesthetics?
Some of the most pressing questions in the study of the interrelations of action 
and space are: Which concepts of space and place are appropriate for analyzing 
relations between knowledge, action, and space? At what level of aggregation 
 (individual, organization, spatial units)2 can relations between knowledge, action, 
2 A social system’s ability to act competently and achieve its goals depends not only on the knowl-
edge of individual actors but also on their integration in organizations (institutions), the way orga-
nizations process information and share knowledge, interact with external social environment, and 
structure the way decisions are taken.
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3and space be documented by which indicators and empirical methods? How much 
are the spatial conditions of actions exposed to historical transformation? What 
exactly is the role and importance of spatial representations for the construction of 
sociocultural realities in the past, present and future? How does the digital revolu-
tion change the historically established society–space relations? What are the spa-
tial implications for the formation of knowledge? Is the term environment an abstract 
category, a social macrophenomenon, a local cluster of individual factors of influ-
ence, or a localized culture? How can one measure an environment’s impact on 
action and knowledge production (Meusburger, 2015a)?
These and other questions indicate that relations between knowledge, action, and 
space are not as simple as some people might assume or as some decision and risk 
models or traditional rational choice theories suggest. The questions simultaneously 
underscore the urgent need to explore the interdependencies of knowledge, action, 
and space from different disciplinary angles, scales of analysis,3 time dimensions,4 
and ontologies.
The main ambition of this book is to contribute to the clarification of the linkages 
between knowledge, action and space beyond the well-established models. To 
redeem this claim it is first necessary to overcome the problematic legacy of homo 
oeconomicus and traditional rational choice theories and discuss some of the rea-
sons why the spatial dimension was neglected or played only a marginal role in 
action-centered social theories. If we want to deepen the insights into the relations 
between action, knowledge and space, then the spatial dimension needs as much 
theoretical inquiry as the relations between knowledge and action (see the chapters 
by Werlen (Chap. 2), Ernste (Chap. 3), Olsson (Chap. 4), Gardenförs (Chap. 12), 
and Berthoin Antal and Friedman (Chap. 13) in this volume).
 The Neglected Spatial Dimension in Modern Social Theory
Until the first decade of this century, one of the key shortcomings of modern social 
theory was the nearly total neglect of the spatial dimension of agency (Giddens, 
1984), communication, social actions (Werlen, 1993b), and social relations. 
Systematic social theories and action theories in particular have so far widely 
ignored the spatial dimension of the social. This blindness for the spatial is embed-
ded in more general features of modern social theory that have important implica-
tions not only in the field of theory, but consequently also for current societal 
problem constellations.
3 Each scale of analysis yields certain insights that other scales cannot deliver.
4 Often the question of whether actors possess the knowledge necessary to solve a problem and of 
which impact on decision-making and actions is due to superior or earlier knowledge or ignorance 
can be answered only after events or actions have taken place and unintended consequences have 
surfaced. Time lags between knowledge acquisition (e.g., research) and successful action (e.g., 
innovations) can amount to many years or even decades.
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tion of spatial issues in social theory is the overemphasis on time. Time, not space, 
has been pivotal for philosophy (Hegel, Bergson), the social sciences (Marx, 
Spencer, Durkheim), biology (Darwin), and history. Time—the sequential ordering 
of events—is obviously central in action theory. The implementation of action plans 
and intentions lies in the future, whereas the present situation of actions has resulted 
from actions of the past. Another notable reason that space aspects have not figured 
greatly in social theory is that the spatial dimension refers first to the ordering of 
physical objects and artifacts. It is thus allied somewhat more closely to immediate 
visual experience and is therefore less “abstract” than is the case with the temporal 
order. But the main explanation for the relative neglect of the spatial dimension 
pertaining to social realities in the action-centered perspective certainly stems from 
emphasis on the subjective meaning of action. The theory of social action as formu-
lated by Weber (1912/1988, 1913, 1922/1980) implied that the embodied actor and 
the physical world were largely left out of the biologistic and functionalist tenden-
cies in the social sciences (Werlen & Weingarten, 2003, pp. 205–207). This exclu-
sion essentially arrested the development of concepts that could have integrated the 
spatial dimension and avoided the pitfall of biologistic or materialistic 
reductionism.
However, when the spatial dimension is taken into account, the word space is 
often not understood as a theory-dependent term but rather as a given fact. The 
social sciences commonly refer to notions of geographic space that are considered 
rather traditional or outdated in current social and cultural geography because they 
conceptualize space as a material object, a container, or projection plane of material 
and immaterial social life. Although lack of a systematic theoretical reformulation 
of space in a more sociotheoretical compatible way is detectable in the work of 
Pierre Bourdieu as well as in substantial parts of Giddens’ (1984) theory of struc-
turation, it is primarily found in social and cultural studies after a shift toward 
acceptance of the spatial dimension occurred. Exponents of this “spatial turn” claim 
to have overcome the spatial ignorance identified in their fields and disciplines of 
study. Their assertion is often unconvincing, however, because space continues to be 
thought of as a material object or container, with little progress toward a conception 
of space that is firmly grounded in social theory in a manner compatible with action.
The continuing overemphasis on the container or geographical earth-space in 
cultural studies and the social sciences leaves the spatial turn incomplete, inflexible, 
and myopic. These limitations also underlie fields of research and social policies in 
which it is not apparent at first glance, especially when “nature” is taken into 
account. An especially prominent example is the sustainability research based on 
the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), known as the 
Brundtland report (Gäbler, 2015; Werlen, 2015), and on purportedly environmental 
policies derived from it. Casting the environment as a container space conceived in 
terms of Newton’s mechanics, the recommendations for environmental policies are 
the product of a mechanical world view. They advertise the idea that it could suffice 
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5to turn some screws of the world machine to, say, decrease the global temperature 
by 2.0° Celsius, as propagated by the COP 21.5
Reconceptualization of the spatial dimension is imperative in the study of the 
interrelation of knowledge and space. When focusing on the role of places, spaces, 
spatial settings, environments, milieus, and fields of communication for cognitive 
processes, learning, knowledge production, and action, one must be careful to use 
the appropriate concepts of place and space in order to avoid implicit determinism 
and reductionism. When the concept of space as used in the natural sciences 
becomes a primary category of social research, it has major and problematic impli-
cations. In keeping with Newton’s theoretical construction of space as a container, 
the two most relevant ones are the underlying spatial determinism and the likelihood 
that values, norms, and other nonmaterial entities will be reduced to earth-spatially 
positioned material objects. The morphing from immaterial to material or physical 
form will certainly not improve the results of social sciences and social politics, for 
all it does is falsify the real nature of sociocultural realities. Social research needs to 
find its own conceptualization of the spatial dimension of societal realities, includ-
ing the generation of knowledge (for details see Schwan, 2003; Steiner, 2003; 
Weichhart, 2003, pp. 19–39).
For decades, unfortunately, subject-oriented action theory neglected the link 
between action and space, that is, the knowledge, competence, experience, skills, 
and learning processes of individuals, social systems, and institutions. Vague allu-
sions to cognitive processes and reflective systems or ascriptions of meaning and 
value to material objects do little to explain why actions succeed or fail, why goals 
are achieved or missed, why some agents are competitive and others not, or why 
interactions with and adaptations to the environment vary so greatly in the spatial 
dimension. The focus should be more on different preconditions and outcomes of 
cognitive processes. To what extent do different levels of knowledge, educational 
achievement, occupational skills, experience, and scientific and technological stan-
dards influence the results of cognitive processes—from perception and situation 
analysis to decision-making and acting.
Material artifacts and spatial configurations acquire a social or symbolic mean-
ing only through symbolic appropriation, through processes of learning, evaluating, 
interpreting, and using them. The results of such ascriptions, evaluations, and inter-
pretations range from knowledgeable to ignorant, depending on the degree of expe-
rience brought to these processes, and the results change over time. It is therefore 
crucial to take into account the social, spatial, and cultural disparities of knowledge, 
competence, and experience as well as the level of research and technology when 
analyzing relations between space and action.
Geodeterminism emerges when the learning and evaluation processes between 
space (as a material object) and action are skipped. For instance, a geodeterminist 
would argue that a mountain range is a natural border; a specific terrain or a gorge, 
an optimal location for a fortification. A social geographer would argue that it is not 
5 Conference of the Parties (COP 21) held in Paris, 15–16 April 2016, was part of the cycle of 
major UN conferences on climate change.
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to build one fortress after the other at the same place. It is rather the result of knowl-
edge accumulation and experience over many generations that led to the firm con-
viction or knowledge that a specific place is an ideal location for a fortress given the 
available transportation and military technologies. As soon as hitherto existing tech-
nologies are disrupted or political territories are expanded, the situation will be 
evaluated differently and people will conclude that other locations are more 
suitable.
In human geography the adventurous sense of reconceptualizing space and spa-
tiality suffuses the publications of Belina (2013), Gregory (1994, 1998), Harvey 
(2005), Lippuner (2005), Lippuner & Lossau (2004), Massey (1985, 1999a, 1999b, 
2005), Paasi (1991), Schmid (2005), Soja (1985), Tuan (1977), Weichhart (1996, 
1999, 2003), and Werlen (1987, 1993a, 1993b, 1995, 1997, 2010a, 2010b, 2013, 
2015), to name just a few. Geographies of knowledge, education, and science 
(Freytag, Jahnke, & Kramer, 2015; Jöns, 2008; Livingstone, 1995, 2000, 2002, 
2003; Meusburger, 1998, 2000, 2008, 2009, 2015a) and creativity studies (Amabile, 
Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996; Amabile, Goldfarb, & Brackfield, 1990; 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, 1999; Hennessey & Amabile, 1988; Meusburger, 2009; 
Sternberg & Lubart, 1999) contributed to that discussion by documenting how edu-
cational achievement, occupational skills, research, and creative processes influence 
actions of individuals and social systems, how research and creative processes are 
the result of interactions between agents and their environment, and why various 
spatial disparities of socioeconomic structures persist for long periods.
 The Problematic Legacy of Homo Oeconomicus and Rational 
Choice Theories
Taking the spatial dimension into account first requires a critical review of the clas-
sical models used in social sciences, especially the model of economic actions 
based on the concept of homo oeconomicus. The claims about its general validity 
and applicability are inherently linked to the alienation of space. The concept of 
homo oeconomicus and the assumptions that traditional rational choice theorists 
make about the human decision-maker and some other premises have been criti-
cized by many authors as empirically unfounded and psychologically unrealistic 
(Buskens, 2015; Flache & Dijkstra, 2015; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2015; Green & 
Shapiro, 1994; Goldthorpe, 2000; Haselton et al., 2009; Hertwig & Herzog, 2009; 
Samuels & Stich, 2015). Theories of bounded rationality, behavioral economics, 
evolutionary economics, new theories of the firm, the strategic management 
approach, and nonrational theories have been divested of many unrealistic premises; 
nevertheless, some theoretical concepts of decision-making used in economics and 
partly also in social sciences6 still carry the detrimental legacy of homo oeconomicus 
6 For an overview of the large variety of rational choice models, see Wittek, Snijders, & Nee (2013).
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7and traditional rational choice theories. We do not repeat here the extensive critique 
of that model but rather focus on those aspects for which the lack of sensitivity to 
the spatial dimension of human existence and sociocultural realities is playing an 
important role, at least from a geographer’s point of view. In the geography of 
knowledge (Meusburger, 1998, 2015a, 2017), one critique is that many theoretical 
concepts of decision-making ignore—
• social and spatial disparities of knowledge;
• the impact that environments, spatial contexts, and spatial relations have on the 
generation and diffusion of knowledge;
• the selective mobility of different categories and levels of knowledge; and
• power structures in space. The enduring persistence of national and global urban 
hierarchies is due mainly to relations between knowledge and power, the spatial 
concentration of power, the vertical division of labor, and selected migration.
Mutual relations between knowledge and power have been intensely discussed else-
where (Gregory, 1998; Meusburger, 1998, 2000, 2015c; Meusburger, Gregory, & 
Suarsana, 2015) and need not be repeated here. They are neatly summarized by 
Foucault (1980):
• The exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowl-
edge constantly induces effects of power. (p. 52)
• Knowledge and power are integrated with one another, and there is no point in 
dreaming of a time when knowledge will cease to depend on power. (p. 52)
• It is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible 
for knowledge not to engender power. (p. 52)
It is also criticized that some scholars do not distinguish between knowledge and 
information,7 and that the costs and time needed to acquire the knowledge, exper-
tise, and the advanced levels of educational achievement necessary to solve com-
plex problems are neglected or underestimated.
From a geographer’s point of view, the ideal-type premises of homogeneous 
space and ubiquity of knowledge are the most critical shortcomings, the assump-
tions farthest from empirically verifiable realities. Unequal spatial and social distri-
bution of various categories of knowledge and skills can be traced to early human 
history, at least to the time when the first scripts were developed (5500 BC). Spatial 
and social inequalities of knowledge, spatial concentrations of power (Meusburger, 
1998, 2000; 2008; 2015c) and hierarchically structured urban systems are a consti-
tutive element of highly differentiated societies that are based on horizontal and 
vertical division of labor. In a knowledge society, the range of knowledge gaps, 
knowledge asymmetries, and spatial disparities of knowledge is larger than ever and 
is constantly growing.8 With respect to the assumption that knowledge is spatially 
7 For detailed discussion see vol. 10 in the series on Knowledge and Space.
8 This statement contradicts the popular view that anybody in the digital age has access to the 
knowledge available worldwide. The Internet offers access to information, not to knowledge. 
Whether available information is understood, accepted, and assimilated into a person’s existing 
knowledge base depends on complex psychological processes (Meusburger, 2017).
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8ubiquitous, the rational choice model is so remote from the empirical facts that its 
heuristic value tends toward zero if the spatial dimension is taken seriously. The 
wide dissemination and use of the premise that space is homogenous certainly has 
to do with the exclusion of spatial and cultural constellations. Unfortunately, it has 
ecologically and culturally problematic consequences as well.
Even within the rules of social modeling, the rational choice model does not 
meet applicable standards. Models may idealize empirical reality only if their heu-
ristic value is not undermined (see Werlen 1993a; 1993b, pp. 43–51). If the model 
strays too far from empirical reality, it can no longer help detect that reality’s regu-
larities or properties. “Without knowledge, or beliefs that correspond to reality, 
thinking is an empty shell” (Baron 2008, p. 15, italics in the source).
The premise that knowledge is ubiquitous is sometimes justified by the impact of 
the Internet. The Internet facilitates the spatial distribution of easily understandable 
information and routine knowledge but certainly does not have deeper balancing 
effects on spatial disparities when it comes to the spatial distribution of jobs that 
need advanced scientific, technical, and expert knowledge. Such jobs are not as 
mobile as some authors may assume, they tend to concentrate in certain places or 
areas (Malecki, 2000; Meusburger, 2000, 2017). Different categories of knowledge 
travel at different speeds and very selectively.9 The individual has limited cognitive 
capacities and only a minute and constantly diminishing share of all knowledge 
worldwide (see the Chap. 7 by Stehr in this volume). Even if the individual pos-
sesses the cognitive capacities to specialize in a certain field, it takes years and 
incurs great cost for that person to acquire such knowledge, educational achieve-
ment, and expertise.
For decades, traditional rational choice theory and instrumental rational action 
models focused on a peculiarly rational and omniscient type of person who has or 
easily gains access to all the knowledge, skills, and expertise needed in order to 
make rational decisions and achieve his or her goals.10 Most adherents of these theo-
ries have ignored or suppressed the fact that people differ in their cognitive capaci-
ties, level of knowledge, professional experience, and skills, not to mention their 
level of education.11 A number of authors writing about rational choice theory 
9 Mobilities of knowledge are the topic of volume 10 in this series.
10 “Neoclassical economics typically employs the assumption of perfect rationality…Rational 
actors never fail to find the action that maximizes their utility, even if this requires unlimited 
capacities to process and memorize all information available and to have unlimited foresight of the 
consequences of all available courses of actions in a distant future” (Flache & Dijkstra, 2015, 
p. 907). Empirical evidence shows that people have limited and unequal information-processing 
and computational capabilities. These findings have led to various models of bounded rationality 
(Simon, 1956, 1982, 1990).
11 Professionals, scientists, engineers, and other experts must study many years to acquire the task-
related or goal-relevant knowledge they need for their problem-solving and decision-making. 
Much of this knowledge and expertise can be learned only in specific institutions of higher educa-
tion. It is therefore difficult to understand why differences in the level of educational achievement 
play but a marginal role in action theory and rational choice theories.
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9(e.g., Buskens, 2015; Radner, 2015) simply altogether avoid using categories such 
as knowledge, skills, expertise, and educational achievement.
Another weakness of traditional rational choice theory is the fact that  rationality—
conventionally understood to be a method of thinking and logical consistency—has 
little explanatory power. The concept of rational behavior focuses on a person’s 
strategic choice of the best means to achieve a certain goal, but it does not include 
consideration of the goal’s reasonableness and attainability or of the resources 
needed in order to pursue the goal.
[F]ormal logic is concerned with the rules for drawing conclusions from evidence with 
certainty. That is, it is concerned only with inference. It says nothing about how evidence is, 
or should be, obtained. Formal logic, therefore, cannot be a complete theory of thinking. 
(Baron, 2008, p. 81)
In decision-making and goal-oriented social action, formal logic must be combined with 
knowledge, expertise, skills, and the newest information. Because actors differ in their 
levels of information, knowledge, skills, experience, and educational achievement, they 
arrive at very different decisions if they follow the principle of rational decision-making. 
What seems rational to an agent who has little expertise and relies on public information 
might be irrational to an actor with great expertise or to a stock broker with insider 
knowledge. “[A] given act may appear rational at the time it is undertaken; yet when a 
different goal is activated to which that act was detrimental it may appear irrational and 
one might come to regret it” (Kruglanski & Orehek, 2009, p. 647). High levels of knowl-
edge, skill, expertise, and early access to important information help people come to 
decisions that are apt to achieve the desired goal. Gaps in expertise, skills, educational 
achievement, and information usually restrict goal attainment.12
Like any goal-directed activity, thinking can be done well or badly. Thinking that is done 
well is thinking of the sort that achieves its goals. When we criticize people’s thinking, we 
are trying to help them achieve their own goals. When we try to think well, it is because we 
want to achieve our goals. (Baron, 2008, p. 29)
Max Weber (1922/1980), who first made rationality a key concept in modernistic 
thinking, was interested in the fact that rationality created a culture of objectification 
(Versachlichung) and relegated myths, superstition, and unjustified beliefs to the 
background. He used the term specifically in the sense of economic rationality that 
denotes the strategic choice of the best means to reach a given goal. However, 
Weber’s concept of rationality was later extended to fields where it was not appropri-
ate. Max Weber never asserted that rationality alone will help define expedient and 
achievable goals, that rational agents are capable of recognizing the value and the 
utility of their goals, or that rational behavior will trigger creativity and innovation.
Aspects of space and spatial contexts did not play a particular role in the debates 
mentioned above, but they were highlighted by debates around nonrational theories. 
Since the late 1990s, nonrational theories, concepts of ecological rationality, geog-
raphies of science, and other fields of social geography have developed a growing 
sensitivity for the significance of spatial contexts, spatial relations, environments, 
12 This observation is even more relevant for social systems than for individual decision-makers.
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and contact fields for learning processes, knowledge production, decision-making, 
and innovation. They have emphasized that learning processes are intrinsically 
interwoven with conceptions of space (see the Chap. 12 by Gardenförs in this 
volume).
 Recent Developments in Decision-Making Theories 
and Geographies of Science: Improvements 
in the Understanding of Relations Between Knowledge, Action, 
and Space
In proposing to use theories of heuristics13 and nonrational tools, Gigerenzer and his 
collaborators have introduced a concept they call ecological rationality (Gigerenzer 
& Gaissmaier, 2011; 2015; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 
2002; Samuels & Stich, 2015; Todd, Gigerenzer, & ABC Research Group, 2012). 
Unlike rational choice theories, heuristic theories of decision-making are concerned 
with psychological realism relating to the capacities and limitations of actual 
humans and emphasize the importance of a specific context, frame, or environment 
and focus on the performance of actors in the external physical and social world 
(Buskens, 2015, p. 903; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2015, pp. 911–912; Hertwig & 
Herzog, 2009; Lindenberg, 2013; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000).
In a world where not all risks are known and where optimization is not feasible, ‘nonra-
tional’ tools such as heuristics are needed…[N]onrational theories apply to ‘decision- 
making under uncertainty,’ where not all alternatives, consequences, and probabilities are 
known or knowable…Rational theories, in contrast, are tailored to situations where all risks 
are known. (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2015, p. 911)
The study of the ecological rationality of heuristics,14 or strategies in general, is a frame-
work to study performance in the external world: A heuristic is ecologically rational to the 
degree that it is adapted to the structure of the environment. Heuristics are ‘domain-specific’ 
rather than ‘domain-general’; that is, they work in a class of environments in which they are 
ecologically rational. Heuristics provide not a universal rational calculus but a set of 
domain-specific mechanisms…, and have been referred to collectively as the ‘adaptive tool-
box’. (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2015, p. 912)
13 “A heuristic is not per se rational or irrational; rather, its rationality depends on the match 
between the architecture of the tool and the structure of the environment in which it is employed” 
(Hertwig & Herzog, 2009, p. 668). “An inferential or judgmental strategy is ecologically rational 
if it is accurate and efficient on the sorts of tasks that were important in the environments in which 
we evolved” (Samuels & Stich, 2015, p. 722).
14 “A heuristic is a strategy that ignores part of the information, with the goal of making decisions 
more accurately, quickly, and frugally (i.e., with fewer pieces of information) compared to more 
complex methods” (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2015, p. 913). “A heuristic is ecologically rational 
to the degree that it is adapted to the structure of the environment. Heuristics are ‘domain-specific’ 
rather than ‘domain-general’; that is, they work in a class of environments in which they are eco-
logically rational. Heuristics provide not a universal rational calculus but a set of domain-specific 
mechanisms” (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2015, p. 912).
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The heuristic approach to decision-making and the concept of ecological ratio-
nality are very similar to concepts used by geographies of knowledge and science 
(Livingstone, 1995, 2000, 2002, 2003; Meusburger, 1998, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). 
They not only respect the view that human cognitive abilities are unequal because 
of different experience and learning processes, but—like the geography of knowl-
edge—also take the environment’s information structure and knowledge milieu into 
account. They accept that both the formulation of goals and the processes of 
information- processing, learning, research, and decision-making can be somewhat 
shaped by their social environment (Flache & Dijkstra, 2015, pp. 908, 911; 
Meusburger, 2015a).
Depending on the prior knowledge and experience of actors, a physical and 
social environment can play the role of an external storage space of information that 
may trigger associations and send cues to the informed agent. People, pictures, 
traces, patterns, institutions, and written sources can help overcome the limitations 
of human memories and cognitive capacities, including the time and effort needed 
to acquire specific forms of knowledge and expertise (Baron, 2008, p. 15). Structures 
and dynamics of environments also affect how people seek out information (Navarro, 
Newell, & Schulze, 2016, p. 45) and which kind of bias they must cope with in their 
search (Fiedler & Wänke, 2009).
Two categories—recognition-based heuristics15 and one-clever-cue heuris-
tics16—closely resemble a concept used in the geography of knowledge, prior 
knowledge. The term Vorwissen (translated in this chapter as prior knowledge) 
draws on the hermeneutic circle and Gadamer’s (1960/1999) term Vorverständnis 
(prior understanding, pp. 250, 275).17
Prior knowledge accrues through learning and experience, includes intuition and 
latent subconscious experience, and is domain specific. Optimal search for 
 possibilities, evidence, new goals, and “actively open-minded thinking” (Baron 
2008, p. 63, italics in the original) need a superior level of prior knowledge. Prior 
knowledge determines whether and how available information is perceived, ana-
lyzed, and evaluated by an actor and whether it enters and broadens that person’s 
body of knowledge.18 Prior knowledge helps one select the most meaningful cues 
and has an impact on how patterns and cues are interpreted. Bushmen (San) in the 
15 The goal of recognition-based heuristics is to “make inferences about a criterion that is not 
directly accessible to the decision-maker, based on recognition retrieved from memory” 
(Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2015, p. 914).
16 One-clever-cue heuristics looks for only one ‘clever’ cue and bases its decision on that cue alone 
(Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2015, p. 914).
17 Prior knowledge and prior understanding are synonymous in the hermeneutic method. The 
method entails a paradox in the sense that what is to be understood somehow has to have been 
understood beforehand. Gadamer also calls it positive prejudgment (hence the terms Vorwissen 
and Vorverständnis). To have prior knowledge or prior understanding of something, one has to 
have already understood individual parts or aspects of it. This requisite is also called the hermeneu-
tic circle. Philosophers preceding Gadamer also thought about this circle.
18 The concept of prior knowledge plays an important role in the communication of various catego-
ries of knowledge (for details see Meusburger, 2017).
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Kalahari are able to sleuth animals like nobody else. Experienced doctors can diag-
nose a disease by interpreting a few signs (students of medicine may not have this 
ability yet). Geographers who are specialists in a certain field of knowledge may 
draw path- breaking conclusions from a thematic map, whereas other persons will 
glean no information at all from the same map. Local people living in the Alps may 
have acquired enough knowledge from previous generations or from personal expe-
rience to recognize from scant, subtle indications which places may be endangered 
by avalanches; most tourists will not be able to evaluate these risks. Many culturally 
transmitted bodies of knowledge are learned through observation of19 important 
environmental cues. In fact, observing and interpreting cues and spatial configura-
tions is a long-standing heuristic device of geography.
Humans are susceptible to social influence and to the type of information that is 
available in their environment. Geographies of knowledge and science have illus-
trated how learning processes, research, and scientific careers can be influenced by 
the local availability of role models, resources, specific thought styles,20 face-to- 
face contacts to prominent scholars, institutional logics, and organizational rules. 
The interrelationships of these factors and others constitute the knowledge environ-
ment of a place (for details see Meusburger, 2008, 2015a; Meusburger & Schuch, 
2012). An extreme example of the impact that different informational environments 
have on decision-making and acting is given by Gregory (2015, pp. 113–114). 
Describing World War I battlefields at the western front and the differences between 
a paper war and a trench war,21 he illustrates the insurmountable gulf between the 
experienced knowledge of the infantry in the muddy trenches of the battlefield and 
the abstract knowledge of the staff officers surrounding the map table in a comfort-
able room and planning the movements of their soldiers for the next days.
Scientific evidence from cognitive psychology (see the Chap. 6 by Funke in this 
volume), sociology (Stehr, 1994, 2005), social geography (Meusburger, 2015a, 
2015c; Werlen, 1993b, pp. 8–11), and other research fields shows that there is no 
direct if–then relation between knowledge and action. There are a number of 
 intervening variables—many of them related to the environment or place of action—
that may modify, weaken, or strengthen the relations between knowledge and action. 
The concurrence and coaction of these variables at a certain place or in a specific 
area build a spatial context, social environment, or knowledge milieu that may affect 
decision-making and action. As pointed out by Fiedler and Wänke (2009, p. 699), 
properties of the environment can constrain or enhance the input to cognitive pro-
cesses. These two researchers illustrate that error and bias may often originate in the 
information environment, in selective accessibility to information; that observations 
19 Learning by observing “includes all cases in which we learn about our environment from obser-
vation alone, without intentional experimentation” (Baron, 2008, p. 14).
20 “The greater the difference between two thought styles, the more inhibited will be the communi-
cation of ideas” (Fleck, 1935/1979, p. 109).
21 “Trench war is an environment that can never be known abstractly or from the outside. Onlookers 
could never understand a reality that must be crawled through and lived in. This life, in turn, equips 
the inhabitant with a knowledge that is difficult to generalize or explain” (Leed, 1981, p. 79).
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can be influenced by environmental sampling; and that agents—in their capacity as 
available sources of information—may lack first-hand experience, overdo some 
risks, and neglect others. In brief, “cognitive processes are fed with an environmen-
tal input that is itself often biased and highly selective” (p. 700).
Talent, motivation, and wealth of ideas are not the only characteristics determin-
ing how successfully a scholar’s research and academic career develops (Meusburger, 
2015a). What we academics call creative is never the result of individual action 
alone. Learning processes and actions are situated in environments, organizational 
structures, and spatial relations. We cannot study scientific creativity by isolating 
scholars and their works from the social and historical milieu in which their actions 
are carried out. The key issue is the interaction with the environment. It is well 
known from creativity studies that a stimulating environment and a talented indi-
vidual must come together and interact before a creative process can occur (for 
details see Amabile et al., 1990, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, 1999; Hennessey & 
Amabile, 1988; Meusburger, 2009; Sternberg & Lubart, 1999).
An environment’s impacts on action must not be regarded deterministically. An 
environment should not be thought of as an independent variable that directly influ-
ences all relevant actors through a direct cause-and-effect relation (if A, then B). It 
depends on processes of evaluation based on learning, knowledge, and experience 
whether spatial structures, physical space, or social environments have an impact on 
human action.
A knowledge environment is a locally available potential or a local range of resources. It 
stands for incentives, challenges, stimulations, opportunities, and support networks that can 
be used, overlooked, or ignored. A knowledge environment can operate as it should only if 
the actors involved use the local resources and interact with each other. The outcomes of 
human interactions and experiences in life are always indeterminate. No one can predict the 
results of appropriation and interaction, whether and how often the local potential for inte-
grating diverse viewpoints and knowledge bases will be activated, and how the relation-
ships between creative agents will develop. Therefore, a knowledge environment’s 
significance and effect can be analyzed only after events have taken place, after the scien-
tific careers and research results associated with that environment have become evident. 
(Meusburger, 2015a, pp. 266–267)
 Collective Action
Organizations, institutions, and other power structures are an environment’s most 
efficient elements for enhancing or impeding the conversion of a person’s knowl-
edge into action. Without the support of institutions, most decision-makers cannot 
reach their goals (Meusburger, 1999, 2015a; Werlen, 1995, pp. 40–49). When study-
ing the relations of knowledge and action in social systems, organizations, or insti-
tutions, one must take additional aspects into account (some of them are discussed 
in the Chap. 11 by Reitz; others, in volumes 6 and 7 of this series). As Goldman 
(2004) states, epistemic organizations need nodal points where information con-
verges and theoretical conclusions are arrived at. But any organization has at least 
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two problems to cope with. First, the knowledge and experience necessary for solv-
ing a problem or making the right decisions to achieve a certain goal may be avail-
able somewhere in an organization, but it may not reach the people authorized to act 
on it. Second, the nodal points or authorized decision-makers may not have the prior 
knowledge, experience, and intuition necessary to understand and evaluate the 
importance of information that has been forwarded to them. Those who decide often 
not understand those who know. And those who know are often experts in narrow 
domains only or are not close to those in power.
Weber’s (1922/1980) ideal bureaucracy rested on the principles of meritocracy 
and the absence of nepotism and incompetence. In that system the hierarchy of 
decision-making corresponded to a hierarchy of competence. High-ranking 
decision- makers were expected to have broader expertise and more experience than 
their subordinates; the superiors would at least be able to understand, evaluate, and 
embrace the information forwarded to them. In large and complex organizations, it 
happens quite frequently that line managers (immediate superiors) have achieved 
their position because of merits other than broad knowledge and expertise in a cer-
tain domain. In some political systems, ideological reliability and loyalty to a politi-
cal party, ethnic group, or powerful network counts for more than expertise does 
when it comes to promotion to a high post. Even if managers understand the rele-
vance and urgency of information, they may fail to draw the necessary practical 
consequences because they are indebted to a political party or a powerful person or 
are under pressure from their social environment.
Organization theory, especially the research field following the tradition of 
Mintzberg (1979), and the geography of knowledge have an abiding interest in the 
organization and coordination of social systems in space and in the spatial concen-
tration of jobs involving high levels of educational achievement and decision- 
making. Originally, region meant a space that was organized, coordinated, 
controlled, and influenced by a power center or a social system’s authority (for 
details see Berthoin Antal, Meusburger, & Suarsana, 2014; Gottmann, 1980; 
Meusburger et al., 2015). Organization theory and the geography of knowledge 
have documented how the structure of a social system—the centralization or decen-
tralization of decision-making authority, skills, and competence within an organiza-
tion—varies with the complexity of its tasks and the uncertainty of its environment. 
In summary, a number of research fields have underlined the importance of an envi-
ronment or spatial context and its possible impact on individual and collective 
action, but their strands of argumentation have seldom coalesced.
 Aims, Claims, and Content of this Volume
A main intention of this volume is to raise awareness of important research issues 
that various disciplines have brought into the field of knowledge, action, and space 
to define research gaps and misunderstandings and, if possible, to build bridges 
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between diverse theoretical approaches. For this purpose we editors have selected a 
broad range of topics and various scales of analysis. More than a dozen disciplines 
do research on knowledge, learning, education, innovation, and creativity. Even a 
glance at the definitions and concepts of knowledge used in different disciplines22 
documents the necessity of looking beyond the fence of one’s own subject and 
avoiding monodisciplinary lists of references. Even if some of the approaches ini-
tially seem mutually incompatible, a synopsis of the relevant research from a variety 
disciplines can help improve the understanding of the links between knowledge, 
action, and space and can prompt new research questions.
This volume brings together a broad range of theoretical approaches delving into 
knowledge, action, and space from different angles. Some of the contributors dis-
cuss knowledge as a social construct based on collective action, on socially embed-
ded and guiding social action. Others look at knowledge as an individual capacity to 
act. The breadth of studies ranges from the role of knowledge in individual action to 
its role in collective action, from knowledge and action in the hunter–gatherer soci-
ety to knowledge production in financial capitalism. The discussion of concepts and 
theories of knowledge touches on topics such as semantic knowledge and its orga-
nization into domains, asymmetrical knowledge and the polarization of knowledge 
and nonknowledge, knowledge and collective action,23 situated problem-solving, 
spatial dispersion of knowledge, knowledge and planning, and expertise as a link 
between knowledge and practical action.
In the chapter following this introduction, Benno Werlen describes the long path 
geographers had to follow before they arrived at concepts of space suitable for 
issues of social geography. Until the late 1990s, the theoretical concepts in many 
fields of human geography diverted attention from the key role that the social 
dimension plays in the construction of meaningful geographical realities.24
Werlen identifies the reasons for the current failure of the spatial turn in the 
social sciences and offers an action-centered approach to developing a constructiv-
ist geography for the digital age. His contribution includes a specific, action-related, 
and action-compatible theory of space that can also take account of different con-
cepts of space for different types of action. In this conceptualization of space, the 
spatial dimension of action and society is related to the corporeality of the actors 
and to the necessity of overcoming distances between actors and the physical ele-
ments of situations and means of action. Because the actor’s body is simultaneously 
22 For an overview of different concepts and definitions of knowledge, see Abel (2008), Meusburger 
(2015c), Stehr (1994, 2005), Stehr and Meja (2005), and Reitz (Chap. 11 in this volume). Reitz 
distinguishes between knowledge as a systematic set of applicable recipes, knowledge as an orga-
nized body of theoretical statements, and knowledge as a developed capacity for situated 
problem-solving.
23 The role of knowledge in organizations was the focus of volume 6 in this series (Berthoin Antal 
et al., 2014) and will be discussed in volumes 11 and 13 as well.
24 The hitherto most convincing theoretical way to integrate the spatial dimension into the field of 
action research is also the narrowest and is of only limited use in social and cultural studies—that 
is, embedding metric space in locational decision-making theory applied to action models based 
on rational choice.
1 Knowledge, Action, and Space: An Introduction
16
the key criterion for distinguishing between direct and mediated experiences and 
between face-to-face and mediated communication, the three main foci of this 
book—action, knowledge, and space—are conceptualized in a new framework, the 
socially constructed relations of space.
The geographer Huib Ernste illustrates in his chapter that the divorce of rational-
ity and reason during the philosophical development of modernity led to recognition 
of different types of rationality, each with its own logics of deliberation and argu-
mentation. Poststructuralists emphasize that each rationality contains multiple para-
digms, each establishing its own set of principles, institutions, and lines of conflict 
that need to be taken into account. He demonstrates how these views are intricately 
involved in late-modern geographical theories of action and in language-pragmatic 
approaches25 in geography.
Proponents of poststructuralist approaches emphasize the structural aspects of 
discourse, especially power structures. Laclau and Mouffe (1985), by contrast, try 
to retain and restore the possibility of deliberative interventions in these discursive 
structures by inverting Foucault’s power/knowledge equation. Ernste explores the 
extent to which this inversion reinstates responsible and rational spatial decisions 
and actions as a focus of research in human geography. In his view rationality could 
be reconstituted as a culturally contingent phenomenon, and critical geographical 
analysis could again contribute to concrete problem-solving, albeit in a culturally 
much more informed and embedded way than hitherto. Ernste also discusses geo-
graphical action theory as put forward by Werlen (1987, 1993a, 1993b, 1995, 1997, 
2010a, 2010b, 2013, 2015; see also Werlen’s Chap. 2 in this volume) in the phenom-
enological tradition of Schütz (1932). According to that school of thought, the inter-
nal mental intentionality directed to outer objects is what ascribes meanings to these 
objects, as people do through their everyday place-making and everyday spatially 
differentiated actions. Ernste interprets this geographic action theory as the 
 subjectivist version of what Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, and Savigny (2001) and 
Reckwitz (2002) designated as the mentalist paradigm in social theory. This 
approach contrasts with the objectivist version of mentalism, which stems from 
classical structuralism.
Ernste shows that the advent of poststructuralist thinking ushered in a great 
reluctance to conceptualize human behavior as conscious rational actions and that 
the term action is generally avoided in most poststructuralist literature. Talking 
about practice instead of action indeed amounts to a novel picture of human agency 
and rationality (Reckwitz, 2008, p. 98). In contrast to Benno Werlen, with his sub-
jective, meaning-oriented approach to geographical action theory, and unlike 
Zierhofer (2002), who advocated the language-pragmatic approach in geography, 
poststructuralist thinkers do not tend to place structures inside the mind or in prag-
matic procedures of interaction but rather “outside” both—in chains of signs, in 
symbols, discourse, or text.
25 Pragmatics is “a branch of linguistics dealing with language in its situational context, including 
the knowledge and beliefs of the speaker and the relationship and interaction between speaker and 
listener” (“Pragmatics,” 2010).
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Ideologies of urban and regional planning have a powerful effect on human 
actions. But to what extent can social behavior be influenced or even determined by 
planning concepts? How can one explain the gap between intention and behavior? 
The geographer Gunnar Olsson describes the ideology of social engineering that 
predominated in Sweden in the 1950s and early 1960s, principles intended to forge 
a happy marriage between scientific knowledge and political action. As the affinities 
between totalitarian thinking and social engineering are impossible to deny, Olsson 
starts his narrative with the role that central place theory and location theory played 
in Nazi Germany. Christaller (1933) and Lösch (1943/1954) were seeking a scien-
tific method to colonize or settle a given area, especially how a set of hierarchically 
nested and hexagonally distributed centers should be tied together into a functional 
whole.
In the thought style of location theory, regional science, positivist thinking, spa-
tial models, and social engineering, it is necessary to describe the functioning of 
society by mathematical calculations. In the 1950s and 1960s politically anchored 
experts took it as their mission to turn Sweden into a People’s Home, a state of 
rationality in which the maximizing principles of utilitarian ethics were institution-
alized. Their intention was to capture the power of social relations in a net of scien-
tific laws (e.g., the social gravity model) and to acquire the means for understanding 
the world and for changing it as well. The history of the social gravity model in 
regional science and of quantitative geography provides an excellent example of the 
ups and downs of theoretical concepts. At first the model was treated as a formula-
tion of great explanatory power; subsequent generations have come to see it as an 
expression of autocorrelation. To demonstrate power-and-knowledge relations in 
the form of a self-referential presentation, Olsson discusses the sculpture Mappa 
Mundi Universalis, conceived and designed by himself and Ole Michael Jensen and 
exhibited in the Museum Gustavianum in Uppsala, Sweden.
A Marxist view on relations between knowledge, action, and space is presented 
by the geographer Richard Peet. Viewing knowledge production from a global scale, 
he analyzes the role of expertise26 in financial institutions, which are now the domi-
nant economic institutions in capitalist societies. Following Marx and Gramsci, he 
states that knowledge production serves a class interest and that class forces lead, 
direct, and control the production of knowledge. What matters in the making of his-
tory are the broad social and cultural trends in thought, imagination, and compre-
hension, such as political-economic-cultural ideas.
He calls the production of sophisticated, but inimical, knowledge in the financial 
system perverse expertise. In this expertise some of the world’s finest minds, such 
as professional economists, do the intellectual and practical modeling and are well 
paid and respected for doing so. But they accumulate knowledge in order to con-
tinue augmenting the incomes of already wealthy people, the capitalist class. In 
Peet’s view, critical mass reaction to financial crisis or the pending world environ-
mental catastrophe is prevented by hegemonic control over imaginaries by a combi-
26 Peet (Chap. 5) defines expertise as high-quality, specialized, theoretical, and practical knowledge 
and regards it as the junction of knowledge and action.
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nation of perverse expertise and mass social unconsciousness. The elites practice 
perverse expertise, and the masses lose their capacity to think rationally and respond 
unconsciously. Peet’s conclusion is that the intersecting economic and environmen-
tal crises will continue ad infinitum because the existing hegemonic knowledge can-
not guide effective social action. Although investor confidence is presented by the 
business media as a neutral, technical, and necessary factor—in everyone’s best 
long-term interest—it is actually a committed, financial capitalist interest based on 
utterly biased knowledge. An instructive example is the global bond market. The 
interest paid on sovereign bonds is determined by the risk of default, with experts 
employing formulae stemming from long experience measured statistically—appar-
ently scientific and necessary. Yet it is actually a few thousand experts representing 
the interests of accumulated capital who tell governments how to run their 
economies.
The next seven chapters focus on the microscale of analysis and discuss con-
cepts, definitions, and research results from philosophy, psychology, and sociology. 
Psychologist Joachim Funke starts his contribution with three questions: How much 
knowledge is necessary for action? Is action possible without knowledge? Why do 
people sometimes act against their knowledge? He discusses some of the standard 
views on the relation between knowledge and action, specifically, the theory of 
planned behavior, the theory of unconscious thought, and the option-generation 
framework. He illustrates the delicate relation between knowledge and action with 
an example from problem-solving research. In Funke’s understanding, problem- 
solving means the intentional generation of knowledge for action instead of simple 
trial-and-error behavior. His studies on the MicroDYN approach, which was used in 
the 2012 cycle of the worldwide PISA study, demonstrate the existence of a clear 
connection between the generation of knowledge and action (i.e., application of that 
knowledge). From the angle of a problem-solving approach, the connection between 
knowledge and action is a classical means–end relation. It is not possible to act 
without knowledge, but people can act against their knowledge.
Nico Stehr, a sociologist of science, offers a sociological critique of the prevalent 
argument that the increasing polarization of knowledge and nonknowledge (or igno-
rance) has become a distinguishing feature of modernity. He acknowledges that 
significant asymmetries of knowledge exist and that knowledge gaps are growing, 
but he rejects the interpretation that nonknowledge is the opposite of knowledge. 
Seeking to avoid that either–or polarity as an arbitrary, theoretically and empirically 
unproductive antithesis, he posits knowledge instead as a context-dependent anthro-
pological constant representing a continuum. In his view there is only less or more 
knowledge, and there are only those who know something and those who know 
something else. The practical problem is always to know how much or how little 
one knows in a given situation. From his perspective the key sociological question 
is how to address the issue of knowledge asymmetry and knowledge gaps in various 
spheres of modern society, such as the economy, politics, the life world, and gover-
nance. He argues that nonknowledge has, in different societal institutions, its own 
functional meaning. There are myriad convincing references to the virtues and 
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advantages of ignorance, a lack or asymmetry of knowledge, and nontransparent 
situations.
The psychologists Ralph Hertwig and Renato Frey address the question of how 
different representations of knowledge shape human actions. Before choosing to 
act, people often try to acquire knowledge about a given situation, opportunities and 
risks, and possible consequences of their actions. In some cases they can draw on 
convenient descriptions of actions and their consequences—such as a medicine’s 
accompanying information on possible side effects and their probabilities. People 
thereby make decisions from description. In everyday life, however, there are usu-
ally no actuarial tables of risks to consult. Instead, people make such decisions in 
the twilight of their sampled—and often limited—experience.
Recent research in psychology has demonstrated that decisions from description 
and decisions from experience can lead to substantially different choices, especially 
where rare events are involved. Studies on modern behavioral decision-making have 
commonly focused on decisions from description. The observations stemming from 
this research suggest that humans overestimate and overrate rare events. To improve 
the understanding of how people make decisions with incomplete and uncertain 
information and how people respond to rare events that have severe consequences, 
Hertwig and Frey recommend study of the psychology and rationality of people’s 
decisions from experience. They find that people relying on knowledge from experi-
ence behave as though rare events are attributed less impact than they deserve, rela-
tive to their objective probabilities. These two researchers review the literature on 
this gap between description and experience and consider its potential causes and 
explanations, arguing that research on description-based behavior should not be 
played off against research on experience-based behavior, that the contrast between 
the two types is enlightening. These observations are not contradictory; they 
describe how the mind functions in two different informational environments.
In recent years many psychologists have proposed that action (social behavior) is 
affected by two interacting systems—the reflective system and the impulsive sys-
tem—that are operating according to different principles (for an overview of the 
literature, see Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004, 2007). “The 
reflective system generates behavioral decisions that are based on knowledge about 
facts and values, whereas the impulsive system elicits behavior through associative 
links and motivational orientations” (Strack & Deutsch, 2004, p. 220). The psy-
chologists Anand Krishna and Fritz Strack focus in their chapter on the striking 
duality of (a) actions planned with reflective, deliberate thought and (b) actions 
caused by spontaneous impulses. First separately evaluating the characteristics of 
reflective and impulsive styles of thinking, Krishna and Strack find that the reflec-
tive system operates according to propositional principles; it is flexible, it requires 
effort and motivation, and its operation is typically conscious. The impulsive system 
operates according to associative principles; it is inflexible, effortless, always active, 
and capable of operating unconsciously.
Building on existing theories of rational thought as well as impulse, impulse 
control, and implicit attitudes, the authors propose an integrative model of thinking 
and action—the reflective-impulsive model (RIM)—to show when which system of 
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thought will be active and under what circumstances they will influence behavior. 
The rational and rule-based reflective system is slow and driven by working mem-
ory capacities and arousal, which set limits for its ability to process information. 
The impulsive system can be thought of as long-term memory and therefore has 
functionally unlimited capacity.
In their RIM model Krishna and Strack describe how the reflective and impulsive 
systems interact during the process of thought. When the reflective system operates, 
it operates in parallel with the impulsive system, not in place of it. When a reflective 
operation begins, perceptual input has already activated several associative ele-
ments. The purpose of the RIM is to provide an answer to the central question of 
how the two mental processes are linked to behavior and especially how they inter-
act through behavioral schemata.
The psychologists Frank Wieber and Peter M. Gollwitzer examine the role that 
spontaneous and strategic planning have in turning an individual’s knowledge into 
action. They point out that knowing which goal one intends to pursue and commit-
ting oneself to that goal are only the first step toward successful goal attainment. 
Planning when, where, and how to act with implementation intentions27 has proven 
to be an effective self-regulation strategy for reducing the intention–behavior gap. 
The authors introduce specific if–then plans for when, where, and how to act, and 
they discuss how such implementation intentions support goal attainment.
They highlight the importance that the accessibility of goal-relevant knowledge 
has for spontaneously formed implementation intentions. As for strategically 
formed implementation intentions, they point to the importance of systematically 
selecting goal-relevant knowledge and translating it into implementation intentions 
by using the self-regulation strategy called Mental Contrasting with Implementation 
Intentions. The authors discuss the interplay of automatic and reflective processes 
and suggest that strategically planning the automatic activation of goal-relevant 
knowledge can support reflective decision-making and goal-directed actions through 
use of context-sensitive reminders. Goal systems are introduced as a conceptual 
framework because they address the question of how goals can increase the acces-
sibility of knowledge about when, where, and how to pursue the goal.
The authors discuss a recent experimental study suggesting that such strategic 
planning is very useful in unstructured situational contexts that require identifica-
tion and selection of appropriate goal-relevant knowledge. They further suggest that 
strategic planning is less useful in structured situational contexts that prompt goal- 
directed actions without requiring any knowledge about advantageous opportunities 
to act and about potential obstacles. One of their main findings is that combining 
mental contrasting and implementation intentions in order to extend planning has 
proven more effective than either mental contrasting or implementation intentions 
alone.
Two chapters present a philosophical perspective on knowledge and action. 
Philosopher Tilman Reitz gives an overview of the broad range of philosophical 
27 Implementation intentions refer to specific plans in which individuals and groups can, by using 
an if–then format, specify when, where, and how they intend to act.
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positions on the essence of knowledge. He argues that the social sciences largely 
lack a well-considered definition of knowledge, whereas philosophical debates 
about such a definition usually fail to include discussion of the social constitution of 
knowledge. In his view both approaches have overlooked or repressed a theoretical 
challenge: the spatial dispersion of social knowledge. He presents a concept of 
knowledge that is both philosophically transparent and empirically helpful for 
understanding basic structures of the knowledge society. Following a pragmatic 
epistemology, he is interested in the question of which understanding of knowledge 
makes sense in what kind of everyday circumstances. In his view the nature of 
knowledge also depends on its social organization. Do people talk about the knowl-
edge of individuals, of collectives, or rather of knowledge incorporated in a set of 
rules? He is interested in changes in the organization and dispersion of epistemic 
practices and in delocalized and resituated knowledge in the digital information age, 
when new information technologies will have huge practical and epistemic effects. 
Encoded information or data can be automatically processed without the interven-
tion of human agents. Stock market programs buy and sell shares, police software 
identifies dangerous persons, and semantic tools browse scientific data bases. Such 
operations involve neither beliefs nor truth and justification; no emotion, prejudice, 
or thought style interferes with them. But they trigger a number of new problems 
and new research questions.
The philosopher Peter Gardenförs, in support of his central hypothesis that 
semantic knowledge is organized into domains, presents a model of domain- oriented 
language acquisition. He defines a domain as a set of integral dimensions separable 
from all other dimensions. Basic domains are cognitively irreducible representa-
tional spaces or fields of conceptual potential. The author proposes conceptual 
spaces as appropriate tools for modeling the semantics of natural language. A con-
ceptual space is defined by a number of perception-based quality dimensions that 
represent perceived similarity.
He offers linguistic evidence for the hypothesis that it becomes easier to learn 
new words within in a domain once it has been established. During the first  formative 
years of life, a child acquires semantic knowledge prior to syntactic knowledge. 
Once the child has learned a word designating a color, for instance, other color 
words will be learned soon after. It is easier to explain to a 4-year-old the meaning 
of the color term mauve than to explain abstract monetary terms like inflation that 
are not yet within the child’s semantic reach. The author explains why grasping a 
new domain is a cognitively much more difficult step than adding new terms to an 
already established domain.
A central hypothesis of Gardenförs’s chapter is that many of these domains are 
closely connected to the development of intersubjectivity. The author defines inter-
subjectivity as “the sharing and representing of others’ mentality.” If somebody 
shares the emotions, attention, desires, intentions, beliefs, and knowledge of others, 
the exchange of knowledge is relatively unproblematic.
Ariane Berthoin Antal and Victor Friedman—both experts on organizational 
learning with an interest in artistic intervention—investigate the relationship 
between physical space and processes of creative thinking and action. They point 
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out that the importance of bodily ways of knowing has long been obvious to artists 
and neuroscientists but that organizational researchers misplaced corporeality for 
many years and have only recently begun to retrieve it by drawing on notions of 
aesthetics. The aesthetic approach to studying human behavior can reveal the roles 
the body plays in reading a context. The authors argue that connecting aesthetic 
approaches to the analysis of the construction of social space enriches the under-
standing of the relational processes of generating shared meaning and agreeing on 
how to behave in the current situation. They stress that people use all their senses to 
seek cues to make sense of and orient their behavior and that the body thereby also 
participates in deciding and signaling to others which rules of the game to adopt for 
the situation at hand (Edenius & Yakhlef, 2007).
This study was set in a region characterized by chronic socioeconomic underde-
velopment and deep intergroup divisions, especially between Jews and Palestinian 
Arabs. Berthoin Antal and Friedman were interested in promoting a process in 
which people could (a) bring up problems, ideas, and visions, (b) meet others with 
whom to learn and to collaborate on issues of common concern, (c) work together 
to create innovative, viable projects and enterprises to meet human and economic 
needs, and (d) create and enact shared visions of regional development that pro-
motes inclusiveness and interdependence rather than competition and divisiveness. 
In a series of videorecorded action experiments28 conducted in a fine-arts studio, the 
two researchers asked the participants to think about how they would use the space 
of the studio to combine processes of social entrepreneurship, conflict engagement, 
and the arts in ways that would connect the college with the community and contrib-
ute to regional development.
The analysis of the video recordings illustrates how physical space becomes a 
part of social space by entering human perception and then being acted upon and 
shaped by people. The authors identified seven distinct configurations29 of social 
space that changed over time as the participants engaged in the task. One of the 
striking outcomes of their video analysis was that commonalities existed across the 
sessions in terms of the knowledge-production processes. The fundamental struc-
tural similarity of the configurations allows the authors to formulate key insights 
into the relationships between space, action, and knowledge generation. The study 
confirms the value of separating visual from verbal analysis.
The final two chapters investigate knowledge (cognitive capacities, rationality) 
and mobility in space. Thomas Widlok—a social anthropologist—studies the rela-
tionship between rationality and action in a hunter–gatherer society. The prime cog-
nitive challenge in this context is human practical reasoning about movement: the 
28 By the term action experiments they mean having participants develop and actively try out ideas 
together in a given space, recording the process, then analyzing it as a basis for ensuing steps.
29 They use the term configuration in four senses: (a) the participants’ positions in the room and 
relative to each other during a specific period of time, (b) the observable interactions of the partici-
pants among each other and with materials in the room, (c) the observable application of behav-
ioral rules, and (d) the creation of shared meaning (to the extent it can be inferred from the group’s 
observable behavior and outputs). The seven configurations they identified were Orientation, 
Meeting Mode, Expansion, Creation, Reflection, Exhibition, and Rehearsal.
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decision to go or to stay. Based on ethnographic work with various groups of mobile 
hunters and gatherers in southern Africa and Australia, the chapter presents an 
investigation of rationality and action from the standpoint of human mobility in 
space. It begins with a critical assessment of probabilistic rational choice models of 
mobility and decision-making and suggests that more promising approaches are 
informed by work on the pragmatics of dialogues and on abductive reasoning. 
Rationality in that view is no longer a purely mental phenomenon, for it is distrib-
uted across social practice and is partially contained in features of the environment 
that western philosophy has long dismissed as irrelevant for understanding human 
rationality.
The psychologists Heidrun Mollenkopf, Annette Hieber, and Hans-Werner Wahl 
document that relations between intention and action (mobility in space) are not 
immutable in the course of a person’s life cycle. Age, mental and physical handi-
caps, personal resources, environmental conditions, and other factors can separate 
actions from intentions. The authors study this issue by interviewing older adults 
about their out-of-home mobility three times over 10 years. They analyze the sub-
jective meaning of mobility over time; perceived changes in mobility and perceived 
reasons for such change; the course of satisfaction in various mobility domains and 
with life in general; and interindividual variation. Perceived changes point to expe-
riences of major loss in the array of mobility and decreasing satisfaction with mobil-
ity possibilities, out-of-home leisure activities, and travel. At the same time, the 
authors find that satisfaction with public transport is increasing among older adults. 
The findings of this study confirm that out-of-home mobility remains of utmost 
importance when people move from late midlife into old age.
 Conclusion
The chapters in this volume illustrate the enormous breadth of the implications that 
the spatial dimension has for action, the production and dissemination of knowl-
edge, the application and understanding of knowledge, and the generation of socio-
cultural and economic realities. They also reveal the large number of open or 
contested research questions to be answered by future research. For obvious rea-
sons, action theory figures prominently in our introduction, but the work presented 
in the following pages indicates how many more theoretical concepts of various 
disciplines could contribute to improve the understanding of the relations between 
knowledge and space on various scales of analysis.
From a geographical point of view, certain key questions are not discussed in this 
volume: How are epistemic authority and competencies construed and evaluated in 
nonwestern or acephalous societies in which individuality and rationality are sec-
ondary to collective values? In which way will new digital technologies change the 
organization and coordination of decision-making in complex organizations? To 
what extent will new digital technologies change communication, interaction, 
supervision, knowledge storage, and social-spatial relations? Will these changes 
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mainly support and strengthen existing power structures or alter them 
substantially?
Taking into account how deeply rooted the spatial dimension is in human exis-
tence with its manifold facets, we can imagine how deep the social changes will be 
upon implementation of changes in social-spatial relations through digitalization 
and with the subsequent changes in the form of communication, interaction, and 
knowledge storage. It is therefore vitally important to include space in social theory 
in general and in action theory in particular. It looks as though Foucault’s (1984/2002) 
prediction quoted at the outset of this introduction is likely to be confirmed, possi-
bly even beyond the issues he raised.
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